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In Scale and Scope Chandler explained the typical directions of growth followed by large scale American 
corporations who sustained their industry leadership. I This involved phases of horizontal and vertical 
integration to capture economies of scale and throughput, followed by product diversification in response 
to new scientific research, and internationalization to exploit their competitive advantages in foreign 
markets. This has not been a universal experience of all countries; successful British firms, for example, 
have been less vertically integrated and Japanese firms were for long reluctant to expand overseas. 
Typical methods of growth - internal expansion, mergers, and interfirm ventures - have been less clearly 
delineated in the historical literature but are nonetheless significant to the success of the firm's strategy. 
Chandler acknowledged that mergers have been important in both United States and Britain but in the 
former they typically led to a large, centralized and integrated organization but in the latter the result was 
more often a collection of small personally run firms. German and Japanese big business have been long 
known for their interfirm cooperation; more recent research has identified similar habits in other nations 
including Britain and Australia, and globally across national boundaries.2 Methods and directions of 
growth are closely interrelated: thus diversification is often facilitated by an appropriate acquisition. In 
this paper we focus upon the growth strategies of the Australian corporate leaders We identified in 
chapter three, their directions and methods, to see if any common patterns emerge and how these results 
compare with the experience of a range of other coulltries. Patterns can form in many ways: generally 
among corporate leaders in response to the national environment; among leaders in an industry or group 
of industries possessing certain key characteristics; among leaders in a particular time period or locality, 
reflecting longitudinal changes in the environment; among firms at a particular stage of their 
development, reflecting life cycle patterns; and among leaders that are either locally owned or part of a 
foreign multinational arising from different influences upon corporate strategy. To lead us into discussion 
of the strategies llsed by our firms to become corporate leaders,we begin by reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different directions and methods of growth. 
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Paths ofCorporate Development: Directions and Methods ofGrowth
Introduction
In Scale and Scope Chandler explained the typical directions of growth
followed by large scale American corporations who sustained their industry
leadership. I This involved phases of horizontal and vertical integration to capture
economies of scale and throughput, followed by product diversification in response to
new scientific research, and internationalization to exploit their competitive
advantages in foreign markets. This has not been a universal experience of all
countries; successful British firms, for example, have been less vertically integrated
and Japanese firms were for long reluctant to expand overseas. Typical methods of
growth - internal expansion, mergers, and interfirm ventures - have been less clearly
delineated in the historical literature but are nonetheless significant to the success of
the firm's strategy. Chandler acknowledged that mergers have been important in both
United States and Britain but in the former they typically led to a large, centralized
and integrated organization but in the latter the result was more often a collection of
small personally run firms. German and Japanese big business have been long known
for their interfirm cooperation; more recent research has identified similar habits in
other nations including Britain and Australia, and globally across national
boundaries.2 Methods and directions of growth are closely interrelated: thus
diversification is often facilitated by an appropriate acquisition
~hi~,~,~E~~J?!~r.c,~~,~"",..f2S~~,PP2H",.,!~~>~g~h,.§tI,8:!~~i~.~".",()f, the ,Australi~n
corporate leaders W~, igeJ1tified.ill Cl111pter three"the~r direct~onsatid, metho~s, to ~~e if
anY_~Q~o~,Pll.!!~~~.~l.P:~r.g~J:lfl(lhQ:'YJg,~§~r~§l!!t~.£Qmpa.r.~,\\Ti!1}.the, ,~~£~ife1.l(;,e ofa
range of other coulltries." Patterns can form in many ways: generally among corporate
leaders In resp~n:~et'O"the national environment; among leaders in an industry or group
of industries possessing certain key characteristics; among leaders in a particular time
period or locality, reflecting longitudinal changes in the environment; among firms at
a particular stage of their development, reflecting life cycle patterns; and among
leaders that are either locally owned or part of a foreign multinational arising from
different influences upon corporate strategy. To lead us into ~iscussion of the
strategies llsed by"our firms to ,become corporate leaden~;'we'begiilbY-reviewing the
streii~hs 1l,nd weaknesses ofthe different directions and methods of growth.
* For the purposes of the Corporate Leadership conference, participants may
wish to concentrate upon the general patterns sections and read the industry evidence
as interested.
How and why firms grow
Chandler, Scale and Scope, chs3-6.
Chandler, Scale and Scope, chs 10-14; FRUIN, W M. The Japanese Enterprise System:
Competitive Strategies and Cooperative Structures. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992; BOYCE, G H.
Cooperative Structures in Global Business. Communicating, transferring knowledge and learning
across the corporate frontier. London: Routledge, 2001.
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Directions
Firms chose between a range of growth directions. They can increase output of
their existing products through horizontal integration, take on additional functions in
the value chain, in other words vertical integration, and they can diversify into new
product lines, market segments, and geographic locations. Each of these growth
directions has advantages but also shortcomings. The benefits of horizontal
integration are particularly associated with cost-reducing economies of scale. An
associated idea is that higher levels of output facilitate supporting activities that
require a minimum level of scale to operate efficiently. These might include particular
marketing strategies, such as branding, and research and development expenditures.
The specialisation implied by horizontal integration brings with it greater expertise
and accelerated learning opportunities. Finally, large size in a particular sector
enhances a firm's market power, providing it with increased control over the market
and greater negotiating strength. The costs of horizontal integration include the
concentration of risk upon a particular product, a limited knowledge of related
products and functions, and the prospect of attracting the attention of competition
policy enforcement agencies due to a large market share.
Vertical integration can reduce transactions costs by bringing contractual
negotiations, such as between procurement and manufacturing stages, under the single
governance structure of the firm. Linked to this is the fact that vertical integration
removes the risk of contractual 'hold-up' (opportunistic recontracting) where the firm
has significant asset-specific investments, which cannot be easily redeployed if
negotiations with another company break down. For the integrating firm, control of
up and downstream functions increases market power over existing competitors and
creates barriers to new entrants. In terms of operations management, vertical
integration can accelerate throughput and mitigate the need to hold inventory stocks.
Where a firm is faced with irregular or non-existent upstream and downstream
functions, vertical integration addresses this form of market failure and helps the firm
to expand its production if horizontal integration is a growth strategy. Vertical
expansion additionally provides a broad and integrated understanding of the extended
value chain, how different parts of it work together and it helps to protect proprietary
knowledge from leaking to competitors transacting with the same firms. On the
negative side, vertical integration, as the 'make' rather than 'buy' decision, also
concentrates the firm's risks into a particular industry and involves additional fixed
costs. Different stages in the value chain often have different economic
characteristics, such as their efficient size, which may not easily be accommodated
within a single organization.
The most common form of diversification is by product. One of the major
advantages of diversification is risk spreading to avoid a downtum in the industry, the
emergence of a powerful competitor, or the attention of the competition regulator.
Sometimes the company has simply grown too large for its existing product line.
Diversification enables firms to pursue growth opportunities in sunrise industries, and
generally to access additional resources associated with other industries. Amongst
these additional resources exist rich veins of information regarding different sectors,
allowing the firm to act as a mini internal capital market, transferring resources
according to the changing fortunes of various industries. Where the new product lines
are related to the firm's original output, cost-reducing scope economies are likely as
tangible and intangible assets can be shared across the firm's different activities. Not
surprisingly, there are costs associated with product diversification. Expertise is
diluted as the firm shifts away from its core competencies, more so where it is
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unrelated diversification. Organisational costs and complexity may increase in
managing an extended range of products with different production and marketing
needs. Where diversification has been driven by government policy, such as
investment incentives or tariff protection, the firm may operate inefficiently and be
vulnerable to changes in official policy.
Market diversification occurs where a firm seeks new markets for its existing
product line; alternative market segments might include low or high income, urban
against rural, household versus industrial customers. It provides some of the benefits
of both horizontal integration and product diversification, notably economies of scale
by selling more of the same product, and risk spreading between markets that may be
affected differently by changes in the environment. Thus, it is also a means of tapping
into the rapid growth of particular market segments according to demographic or
income shifts. The disadvantages relate to the potentially different marketing needs of
alternative segments, thereby weakening opportunities for scope economies in
marketing. Brand development may be different across markets and, further, product
reputation may be diluted by going down market, or difficult to build if moving up
market.
Geographic diversification takes firms into new spatially distinct markets. This
is most significant when firms expand internationally since this takes them across
national boundaries and frequently into societies with different cultural, legal and
institutional norms. Often firms move along a learning curve of internationalization
from exporting, through contracting with a local firm, to foreign direct investment.
An extensive literature exists on the internationalization process of firms. 3 Essentially,
firm-specific and country-specific advantages exist for firms going multinational. In
the former case, international expansion exploits ownership advantages unique to the
firm such as superior technology or management systems, privileged access to finance
or raw materials, greater market power and scale economies from larger size, and
product branding and advertising. These advantages generate a quasi rent for the firm
that is greater than the extra cost of doing business in a foreign setting. Country
specific advantages reflect conditions in the recipient nation conducive to local
production such as cheap or well-trained labour, high quality infrastructure, and
preferential policies from governments keen to attract investment. Multinational
investment may also occur in response to market imperfections such as tariff barriers
erected by recipient nations. As a geographical form of diversification, international
expansion additionally promotes risk spreading. The weaknesses of multinational
activity particularly relate to the costs and challenges of cross-cultural and long
distance control and coordination of the enterprise.
Methods
There are three main methods of effecting the types of growth strategies
described above. These are by internal expansion, mergers, or interorganisational
agreements. Again each brings both benefits and shortcomings. Internal expansion,
sometimes referred to as greenfield investments, involves growth through continued
development of the firm's own internal resources. It provides full control over the
development process, affords protection of proprietary knowledge, and avoids the
cultural clash and integration costs associated with mergers and acquisitions. On the
In particular see L. S. Welch and R. Luostarien, 'Intemationalisation: evolution of a concept',
Journal ofGeneral Management 14, 2,1988; A. Rugman and A. Verbeke, Global Corporate Strategy
and Trade Policy (London, 1990); 1. H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy
(Wokingham,1993).
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negative side, internal growth tends to be slower than by acquisition particularly for
the purposes of diversification since the finn has to learn about the new product or
industry and seek out suitable human and physical resources. Internal growth
additionally lacks the synergies, shared experiences, and general cross-fertilisation
associated with other growth methods.
Mergers provide something akin to instant corporate gratification. Ready-
made companies are acquired thereby telescoping the growth process. Tangible and
intangible assets, including expertise, equipment, and market position, are purchased
together with exposure to alternative corporate practices. Efficiencies can be derived
from eliminating duplication and a rival is often removed. However, acquisitions are
generally expensive because of the premium share price paid to convince sceptical
shareholders. The acquired or merged organisation generally comes as a package,
containing weak or unsuitable elements, that have to be refonned or disposed of, as
well as appealing ones. Integration of the organizations to achieve enhanced
efficiency can be an expensive and time-consuming business, and they have to be
weighed against the benefits of maintaining some of the corporate identity of the
acquired finn.
A wide variety of interfinn relationships provide an intennediate strategy
between internal growth and merger.4 They range from relatively loose licensing
arrangements between finns, through agencies, strategic alliances, and franchises, to
the tightly organized joint venture as a separate company owned by the partner firms.
What these arrangements all have in common is the opportunity to acquire expertise
and yield synergies through only a partial surrender of sovereignty and at a generally
lower cost than merger or internal growth. They are particularly suited to firms with
complementary resources and they provide an ongoing and flexible way of gaining
synergies in contrast to the once-only merger 'event'. Partners to interfirm
agreements particularly seek to share market information and infrastructure costs,
thereby allowing reasonable autonomy of production for individual firms. The costs
of interfirm relations are largely those associated with building and sustaining the
trust that underwrites the relationship, most particularly ingratiation and sensitive
monitoring. The failure to sustain high levels of trust leads in many cases to the
breakdown of the agreement. With such a breakdown each firm has surrendered
know-how to the other firms that may now become its rival. Tighter forms of
interfirm relationship, most notably the joint venture, help to provide a permanency to
the relationship, but can run into organizational problems if the culture of the partner
firms is quite different and thus their view of how the joint venture should operate.
Exit costs will also be higher if the joint venture breaks down.
Thus, the choices of direction and method of growth are complex decisions
that will change over time in response to alterations in the environment and the
character of senior management. We saw in chapter one that Australian firms have
faced an operating environment with a particular combination of elements, most
notably geographic remoteness, a small population, interventionist governments, high
levels of foreign direct investment, colonial influence, a frontier experience, a late
developing capital market, and a strong comparative advantage in primary industries.
Together these elements suggest an environment characterized by rapid change and
high levels ofuncertainty.
4 G. Boyce and S. Ville, Development ofModern Business, ch. 9 discusses a wide range of
interorganisational structures in detail.
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Some of these environmental influences have been apparent in many
countries, but their combination is very unusual. Thus, some of the smaller nations of
northern and western Europe, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland also
suffered from small populations that meant a limited market and labour supply.
However, they benefited from geographic proximity to other large markets in Europe.
The United States and Canada have experienced colonial and frontier influences but
within the context of much larger populations and less geographic isolation. Japan has
had an active state, relative remoteness from the more developed regions, and late
development of its capital market. However, it has an abundant population but no
comparative advantage in primary industries nor large inflows of foreign direct
investment.
Growth directions of Australian corporate leaders
General patterns
Australian corporate leaders recognized the need to attune their directions of
growth to the particular environment in which they operated. Since the operating
environment in twentieth-century Australia changed rapidly, corporate leaders needed
to show adaptable qualities, reducing their exposure to industries in decline or subject
to new multinational entrants. Corporate leaders all changed their directions of
growth, often several times, over their lifespan. It was their responsiveness to the
environment and speed of change that gave many of these firms their competitive
edge over rivals. Related to this was the ability of corporate leaders to recognize
mistakes, or false strategies, and make the necessary changes in direction. In addition,
companies responded to changes in the conventional wisdom of corporate growth
imported from countries like United States and Britain, adapting it where possible to
the specific needs of the Australian environment. The speed of dissemination of such
information particularly suited foreign multinationals operating in Australia and local
companies with overseas links. Finally, growth directions were influenced in a
number of cases by the active role of government in the economy, providing an
incentive for firms to invest in good working relations as a form of strategic asset.
Horizontal integration was the most common early form of growth. Given the
smallness of the market in Australia, where many industries could not support more
than one or two large scale enterprises, rapid horizontal expansion was vital to
achieve the dominance of a first mover, many of whom proved difficult to dislodge in
the relatively uncompetitive markets of Australia. Building scale lowers costs in most
industries, especially at the relatively low levels of production in Australia. While not
driving down costs to the extent possible in larger overseas markets, horizontal
integration gave the firm a significant competitive edge over its domestic competitors.
Many Australian leaders were not in the technology-intensive manufacturing
industries identified by Chandler in America, however scale economies were yielded
in other ways such as in marketing, managerial deployment, and information use.
Perhaps most important was the ability of many leaders to leverage their expertise to
establish new branches and plants across Australia.
Vertical integration frequently followed quickly upon horizontal expansion.
The small market often sustained insufficient upstream and downstream firms to
maintain the necessary throughput of a large firm, thereby necessitating vertical
integration to overcome this form of market failure. Where functionally sequential
firms existed, the smallness of their numbers presented serious risks of 'hold up'
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because of the lack of competing suppliers in a small economy. Vertical integration
additionally provided a growth path consistent with an expanded position in the
product market and helped to build entry barriers against potential competitors for
small markets. It is less likely, however, that most Australian firms operated on a
scale where significant transactions cost savings would be yielded by internalizing
supply and distribution functions in the manner of American firms.
Many firms pursued related product diversification at a somewhat later stage
of their development. They outgrew their small local markets and viewed related
diversification as a sensible growth strategy. It built upon their existing competences
within the Australian market to yield scope economies. In the more scientific
industries, related diversification was a response to similar policies overseas from the
interwar period, as Chandler has particularly noted of America.s However,
diversification among local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals was often less
notable because of the constraints imposed bl their parent companies and their legal
rights to acquire other Australian companies. The earliest diversifiers, such as CSR,
pursued this growth strategy in the interwar years but it became more common after
1945. Unrelated diversification has enabled some firms to enter new growth
industries and risk spread away from declining industries, or where they encounter a
real or credible threat from a multinational. 'Conglomeration', as it is sometimes
known, was additionally an imported 'fad' of the 1960s to 1980s, based on the
optimistic belief that good managers would excel in any industry. The poor
performance of many of these conglomerates in Australia has led firms to divest some
of these additional activities in the 1990s and return to their 'core competences' in
order to survive.
Geographical diversification initially involved firms moving interstate in order
to expand their market. We saw in chapter three that this was a common experience
among our corporate leaders. Expansion overseas came later in the life cycle of most
companies, if it came at all. The small and fragmented local market made it difficult
for many firms, particularly in manufacturing, to grow to a scale of efficiency
necessary to compete in many larger overseas markets. Geographic distance presented
an unacceptable managerial challenge for most Australian firms. The lateness of
Australian industrialisation additionally meant local firms often faced entrenched
international oligopolies There were few countries where the specialist skills of
Australian firms of the primary and related sectors could be leveraged to advantage.
Official policy in the form of import tariffs and a weak domestic competition policy
constrained the development of efficient Australian firms able to operate successfully
in foreign markets. Local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals might have been
expected to embrace internationalization more enthusiastically. In practice, most of
them were limited to exporting by parental strategies designed to mitigate competition
with other subsidiaries of the company? Before about the 1970s, therefore, overseas
growth was largely limited to New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. These locations
can most obviously be explained by their geographic proximity. The psychic
proximity of New Zealand was also important as the two nations shared colonial,
cultural, and institutional similarities. The Pacific Islands, on the other hand,
provided opportunities for resource-oriented multinationals. The belated industrial
Chandler, Scale and Scope, chs 5, 6.
Capon et aI, p. 54.
Arndt, H. W. and Sherk, D. R. 1959. 'Export Franchises of Australian Companies with
Overseas Affiliations', Economic Record 35,71; Hogan, W. P. 1967. 'British Investment in Australian
Manufacturing: the Technical Connections', Manchester School ofEconomics and Social Studies, 35.
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development of New Zealand and the Islands additionally provided a market for
Australian manufacturing firms, and one that was of a smaller and manageable size in
comparison with many other foreign destinations. While expansion into New Zealand
and the Pacific Islands provided a relatively easy first jump overseas, it was a poor
springboard to other international locations, especially larger and more distant
industrial nations.8
In the last few decades of the twentieth century, however, Australian corporate
leaders have ventured into a wider range of countries across Asia, Europe, and North
America. This has arisen for a number of reasons. Globalisation has extended the
reach of firms worldwide. Australian firms have been able to exploit improved
communications in order to mitigate the informational drawbacks of remoteness. The
diversification of the Australian economy away from its primary resources base has
created firms with competences suitable to many overseas locations. Deregulation of
financial markets, tariff reductions, and the enhancement of competition policy have
all contributed to the accelerated internationalization of Australia's corporate leaders.
Thus, we can see that among Australian firms there were identifiable patterns
of growth from horizontal and vertical integration to product and geographic
diversification. In addition to firm life cycle patterns, there have been longitudinal
patterns arising from changes in the Australian macroeconomy, with diversification
particularly emerging from the interwar years, conglomeration from the 1960s, and
internationalization from the 1980s. We now tum to look at these trends more closely
for industry-specific patterns and to substantiate the above generalisations.
Industry patterns
Industries possess certain key economic characteristics that can influence the
nature and extent of their growth. These include the extent of labour or capital
intensity, the scale of efficiency, reliance upon technical change, market orientation,
and product features. Thus, for example, in industries with high levels of minimum
efficient scale, firms may dash for horizontal growth to claim first mover advantages
particularly in a small economy like Australia.
Mining
The leading mining companies illustrate the rush to horizontal expansion to
comer a limited market and establish prime mover advantages through lower costs in
a capital intensive industry. In particular, BHP had positioned itself as the leading
silver, lead, and zinc miner by the early twentieth century. This proved to be an
important prerequisite to forward vertical integration into steel production, which
began with the opening of its Newcastle steelworks in 1915 and was extended with
the Port Kembla works from 1935. Chairman Essington Lewis made this the core
growth strategy of the firm from the 1920s, supported both by tariff protection and the
lower costs achieved by the initial horizontal integration. WMC similarly built scale
and low costs through extended horizontal integration from the 1930s to the 1970s.
The expertise WMC built up in the process was reflected in its innovativeness in
production and organisation: for example, it operated identical plants, centralized
purchasing, and amalgamated the Kalgoorlie mines for servicing by a single treatment
plant.9 Although WMC combined exploration with extraction, the opportunities for
further vertical integration with gold were less promising. CRA's forerunner, Zinc
D. Merrett, 'Australian firms abroad: why so few, why those, and why there?'
Clark, 1983, pp. 120,151-4.
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Corporation, began in 1905 as a zinc producer and then vertically integrated
backwards into mining. However, it vertically integrated before it had built up scale
in order to secure supplies and avoid contractual hold-up. Contractual hold up is
particularly important in industries with concentrated ownership and capital intensity
in assets that are not easily redeployed ('asset specificity'). Mining fits all of these
features, particularly in the supplying of large steel mills. The limited number of
upstream and downstream players in the small Australian economy heightens the risk
of hold up. Mount Isa Mines (MIM) also struggled to establish an efficient scale for
integrated lead and zinc mining and smelting.
Postwar diversification was common in mining and provided firms with a
broader revenue base and new growth opportunities. This was mostly narrow related
diversification within the resources sector. BHP's forward vertical integration into
steel production positioned it well to diversify into a range of related downstream
products including steel alloys, tools, fence posts, drums, and hot water systems.
Somewhat more broadly, BHP leveraged its competitive leadership in steel products
to establish a shipbuilding yard at Whyalla in 1941, and by 1960 operated the largest
shipyard and non-government shipping line in Australia. Since the 1960s BHP has
leveraged its expertise in mineral extraction into the booming offshore gas and oil
exploration industries. The extent and success of these activities can be seen by the
profits of the company's oil division, which were ten times that of steel making by
1974. 10 With limited opportunities for vertical integration in gold production, WMC
embarked upon extensive diversification into other minerals, particularly nickel,
bauxite, copper, and iron, from the 1950s, and used this as a basis for vertical
integration. Bauxite was discovered in the Darling Downs in the late 1950s, copper in
the Warburton Ranges in 1965, and nickel in Kambalda (WA) in 1966. The company
also began mining iron ore and talc in the 1960s. Vertical integration arising from
this included a nickel refinery at Kwianna (WA) in 1970 and WMC's role in the
establishment and operation of aluminium company Alcoa from 1961. From the late
1930s MIM used diversification into copper, which could also be mined at Mt Isa, to
overcome its lack of scale and efficiency in lead and zinc. By the 1950s it had built
vertical integration onto scale in copper as a miner, smelter, and refiner. This provided
a growth direction and a solution to the lack of domestic refinery capacity. I I
With its Townsville copper refinery dominating national output, MIM was
able to expand its range of copper products including billets, wires, bars, and rods.
Since the demand for copper is relatively limited, the company began to diversify
again in the 1970s particularly into coal and iron ore. Diversification was vigorously
pursued by CRA's predecessor firms for similar reasons to MIM. The creation of
Consolidated Zinc Corporation in 1949 integrated its lead and zinc manufacture. By
the early 1960s it was exploiting improved processing technologies, which enabled
the production of sulphuric acid to supply chemical producers. It additionally
generated phosphoric acid for use in fertilizers by farmers. The firm also diversified
into mineral sands, uranium, oil, coal, and natural gas from the 1940s onwards.
Finally, CZC entered aluminium production with the discovery of bauxite at Weipa
and created Comalco in 1956 to develop the deposit.
By the 1990s there was evidence of divestment taking place to slim down and
focus some of the diverse resources interests of the companies. BHP had begun
10 Trengove, A., What's goodfor Australia! : the story ofBHP (Stanmore,
N.S.W., Cassell Australia, 1975), pp. 206-15.
11 Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence, p. 135.
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discharging non-strategic assets as early as 1987 with the sale of Blue Circle Southern
Cement. WMC has sold off some gold, petroleum, copper, nickel, and talc interests
on a selective basis
The focus of production by Australian mining companies has been
overwhelmingly domestic for most of the twentieth century. However, in the same
way that postwar product diversification was sought as a means of overcoming
limited markets, exports provided the same potential for growth. WMC exported
nickel to Japan (including Sumitomo Metal Mining Company) and Canada (for
example Sheritt Gordon). Additionally, it supplied iron ore to Japanese steel mills and
sold talc in the European and United States markets). Likewise, MIM addressed the
limited domestic copper market by exporting to Japan in the 1960s. As it diversified
its output MIM also diversified its overseas markets especially when Japanese steel
mills used their contractual strength to extract a 12 per cent reduction in supply prices
in both 1983 and 1984. In these circumstances MIM turned to long term contracts
with European steel producers. CRA sought overseas markets to sustain its expansion
in the 1970s.
As well as seeking out foreign markets, Australian mining companies have
acted as resource-seeking multinationals in recent decades, applying their
competences to exploration and extraction opportunities across their diverse range of
natural resources. BHP has achieved important overseas expansion since the 1970s
including coal mines in New Mexico, the discovery of Escondida, a major copper
mine in Chile, and the Ekati diamond mine in Canada. Recent projects in the 1990s
have included natural gas pipelines in South America, petroleum projects in Vietnam,
and steel production in Thailand. WMC has built up its overseas investments in
nickel, copper, lead, and zinc, particularly in countries on the American continent
such as Canada, USA, Brazil, and Chile in the 1980s and 1990s. CRA has followed a
similar pattern of overseas investments, being described by Tsokhas in the 1980s as,
'a transnational corporation with increasingly global interests' .12 The company has
particularly focused on Europe, acquiring zinc smelting plants in the United Kingdom
that have allowed it to produce and sell within the European Union, thereby avoiding
the latter's common external tariff.
Pastoral agencies
Horizontal integration was the dominant growth strategy of the pastoral
agents (stock and station agents) through at least the first half of the century.13 The
rapid expansion of raw wool output in Australia, with the extension of settlement,
provided the opportunity for a group of about half a dozen firms to grow horizontally
to yield economies of scale. The fixed costs of their business - branch offices,
auction sites, commercial information - were spread across a wider range of client
farmers, and the firms' evolving expertise could be used to leverage expansion into
newly settled pastoral regions such as in parts of Queensland and Western Australia.
As they expanded, the firms were able to offer farmers a full range of pastoral
services - wool and livestock sales, finance, and technical and business advice. This
spread of services yielded economies of scope by using the same physical assets and
customer information. As a result, the agents built up substantial information files on
each farmer from which to provide more informed advice to farmers and better
monitoring systems for themselves. In turn, this meant lower transaction costs for
12
13
Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence, p. 88.
This section is largely taken from Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs, ch. 2.
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both agent and fanner, and the development of high degrees of trust between them.
These large agencies additionally benefited from being able to offer their range of
services as virtual joint products - for example, fanners needed short tenn finance on
their consigned wool, and business advice regarding the state of the market. Well-
resourced larger finns were best placed to attract fanner clients with the lure of
financial support.
The shift of the international wool market from London to Australasia between
about 1880 and 1930 was pioneered by these agents through their influence over most
local wool production. Goldsbrough Mort pioneered this market relocation, being
quick to recognize the opportunity. However, Dalgety with its somewhat larger
resources and market share rapidly followed suit and surpassed Goldsbrough. AMLF,
constrained by its cumbersome decision-making processes was a late entrant to the
local auction and failed to catch Dalgety. Elders in turn surpassed Dalgety in 1959.
Vertical integration was rarely pursued by the agents with any vigour or
persistence. Some integrated backwards into fann ownership towards the end of the
nineteenth century, partly through the necessity of foreclosure on some irretrievably
indebted fanns, and as a result of the fanning interests of senior partners. Land taxes
on large landowners and uncertainty regarding land tenure laws threw a shadow over
this policy. Dalgety was one of the first finns to abandon this strategy at the beginning
of the century, using the proceeds of divestment to finance their expansion of agency
services. Several companies, including Elders, integrated forwards into shipping and
dock services to overcome market failure in the fonn of insufficient provision of these
services or to avoid contractual hold up by powerful international shipping
companies.
Both backward and forward vertical integration provided few benefits for
finns seeking to dominate the industry. They required expensive commitments in
activities involving different fonns of expertise. While fanning investments might
involve synergies in expertise, they required a concentration of risks in a highly
unpredictable industry and might diminish the perception of the agent as an honest
broker rather than a powerful fanning competitor. Instead, strategic investments,
upstream through fanner finance, and downstream through share ownership in
shipping companies and an exchange of services, provided the strategic benefits
without the concentration of risk or dissipation ofexpertise.
Beginning in the interwar years, pastoral agents considered new products and
markets. The relative importance of the rural sector began to decline with the
expansion of manufacturing, and wool faced challenges from substitute fibres. On top
of these secular changes, the agents endured a severe cyclical downturn in the rural
industries between the wars. While moves to diversify were thereby influenced by
cyclical and secular uncertainty, they also saw opportunities to gain scope economies
by marketing a wider range of products to a ready-made clientele of fanners through
their branch network. Therefore, agents began to sell a wide range of merchandise to
fanners. Several companies, particularly Dalgety, also branched out into the motor
trade, exploiting scope economies from the demand for agricultural machinery to sell
automobiles to fanners.
The continued expansion of manufacturing after World War Two and the
intensification of competition among the agents for a stable or contracting market
produced more extensive diversification. By the 1960s, they had begun to move into
a wide range of unrelated complex manufacturing and service industries including
engineering, property, construction, home appliances, alcohol, metallurgy, and
international trading. Market diversification built upon product diversification since
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they could sell consumer products into a wider national market beyond farming
communities. Finally, they also diversified by function, trading in many products
rather than serving as commission agents, a strategy justified by the larger volumes of
products and wider range of customers. Internal discussion documents make clear
that fact that the agents had some reservations about broad unrelated diversification.
However, in the 1970s and 1980s they were all swallowed up as part of the large
conglomerate enterprises of the time. Recently, some of these large conglomerates
have been broken up, most notably the separation of Elders from Fosters in 1993.
Internationalisation has played only a limited role for pastoral agents. Most
saw the strategic benefit of operating a London office and several, particularly
Dalgety and NZLMA, had extensive operations in New Zealand. Common skills
could be used in the two countries and these operations were helped by geographic
and cultural proximity. In the interwar years, Dalgety, NZLMA and AMLF sought to
leverage their competitive advantages in East Africa and South America but
encountered very different operating environments. The companies complained of
poor infrastructure, financial instability, and unhelpful government intervention.
Climatic differences and the need to diversify into unfamiliar crops such as coffee and
sisal were also factors. Diversification within the growing Australasian market was
viewed as a better option.
Financial services
Horizontal integration in retail banking products has been the predominant
growth path of all of Australia's leading banks. 14 With the partial exception of the
Commonwealth Bank, this has been achieved by developing a nationwide branch
network together with some overseas expansion. While banking provides few
technological economies typical of Chandler's large scale American manufacturing
enterprises, the banks, like the pastoral agents, were able to achieve cost savings by
leveraging their expertise in the provision of specialist services across the expanding
Australian continent, thereby telescoping the learning curve. In a similar fashion again
to the agents, they found little use for vertical integration.
From the mid 1950s the banks diversified their product range, largely in
response to regulations imposed on their core trading business. Thus, BNSW turned to
savings banking in 1956, followed a few months later by ANZ. They then moved into
hire purchase, nominee companies, and later into merchant banking, insurance, funds
management, as market maker in the American bonds market, and bullion dealing.
The timing of these moves and the extent of the banks' involvement have been
frequently subject to government regulation and approval.
Where the banks have differed significantly from the pastoral agents is in their
overseas expansion. By offering services that are not specific to the primary industries
but are in demand worldwide, they have competed successfully in an international
market for banking services. The BNSW, for example, opened a London office as
early as 1853, and then proceeded to develop an extensive network of overseas
correspondents. It opened branches in Fiji in 1901 and PNG in 1910. The next wave
of international expansion began in the 1960s with representative offices or branches
being opened in the USA, Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan. These new locations
reflected the need to be represented in the world's financial centres, particularly after
14 The conclusions of this section can be equally applied to life offices, most notably AMP.
12
the rise of eurocurrency markets, and the shifting pattern of trade away from the
United Kingdom and towards the United States and Asia. ls
Shipping
Horizontal integration dominated the early growth strategies of Australian
shipping companies. This was to be expected in an industry of high capital intensity
and scales of efficiency. In the age of steam and then motorized liners, the ability to
offer regular services across a wide range of routes provided a strong competitive
advantage. Adsteam, for example, built up a sizeable fleet in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries operating in both the coastal and overseas trades, and serving
the cargo, passenger, and tourist trades.
Horizontal expansion was supported through integrating backwards such as
into port functions (engineering workshops, tugs) and coal production. The high level
of asset specificity of the modem shipping industry and the industrial concentration in
these capital intensive areas required vertical integration to protect the access of
shipowners to these services and to avoid opportunistic recontracting. Dominant
firms like Adsteam had reached levels of shipping output sufficient to justify such
integration, which in turn aided their further growth. Adsteam's acquisition of
collieries in Newcastle and Wollongong in the early years of the century enabled them
to expand their fleet of steamers without risk of hold up. Huddart Parker similarly
acquired coal capacity between about 1914 and 1921.
The alternative national transport systems of aviation and motorized road
haulage began to emerge in the interwar years. They represented serious competition
for the coastal routes around Australia on which shipping companies relied so heavily.
Shipowners responded in several ways, partly through closer cooperation amongst
themselves as we shall see later. In addition, they sought to diversify their risks by
investing in other industries. Most notable was Adsteam's move into air services,
believing this to be, 'the way of the future', with their establishment of Adelaide
Airways in 1935. As a closely related transport industry, Adsteam could leverage
many of its managerial skills from shipping into aviation. With further expansion in
the following year the company was operating air services to many parts of South
Australia and across the border into Melbourne. 16
However, it was in the postwar years that Adsteam began to diversify more
broadly into unrelated industries. This included investment and property ownership,
vineyard and wine production, optical goods manufacturing and distribution, and
engineering. By targeting faster growing industries Adsteam was able to stem its fall
from corporate leadership. Huddart Parker failed to diversify sufficiently and,
overcommitted in particular to the coasting trades, fell from the top 100 group in
1952. Howard Smith had diversified from an early stage as a part founder of
Australian Iron and Steel in 1915 (?). While recognizing the pressures for change in
the second half of the century, it has focused upon vertical integration and narrower,
related forms of diversification than Adsteam. This has particularly involved marine
towage, line boat services, salvage operations, shipping agency, and stevedoring as a
means of shoring up its position in the maritime sector. In the 1980s and 1990s
J5 Merrett, 2002, 'The internationalization ofAustralian banks', Journal ofInternational
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.
16 Page, M.F., Fittedfor the voyage: the Adelaide Steamship Company 1875-




Howard Smith diversified into engineering and the distribution of hardware and
industrial products while seeking to minimize its ownership of non-core assets.
While Australian shipping companies sailed on overseas routes, they mostly
relied upon the services of foreign shipping agents and port services rather than
undertake substantial foreign direct investment. Visits to specific foreign ports by
their fleet were insufficiently regular to justify investment in fixed assets and the
development of a local presence in general. However, both Adsteam and Howard
Smith have leveraged their maritime expertise to provide port services generally to
shipping in a number of countries including Britain, New Zealand, India, Fiji, and
PNG.
Aviation
In aVIatiOn both Qantas and Ansett sought rapid horizontal integration to
obtain a dominant market share in a rapidly expanding industry. Like shipping,
developing a network of services to offer customers was a vital competitive advantage
and additionally helped to raise the load factors of expensive airliners. However,
government policy exerted a much stronger influence over corporate strategy in the
aviation industry. Qantas relied heavily upon government subsidies to develop its
earliest routes in the 1920s, working more effectively with the Civil Aviation
Department to this end than some of its earliest rivals such as Lasco. 17 As
government route subsidies reduced in the 1930s Qantas began expanding its
interstate routes and the beginning of the Empire mail service to Britain.
Immediately after World War Two Ansett began to build its position in the air
freight market: by transporting passengers during the day and frei~ht at night it
significantly improved its airliner utilization above a low 54 per cent. I The resulting
scale economies, along with cost cutting, enabled Ansett to be highly price
competitive in establishing its market position in competition with other pioneers such
as ANA and TAA. Ansett's 1957 acquisition of ANA followed by a tightening of the
two airline government policy in 1958 helped to sustain the airline's fleet expansion
and keep out competitors.
Both Qantas and Ansett pursued vertical integration in their early years due to
the lack of ancillary service providers for this new and technologically complex
industry. In the interwar period Qantas built and maintained its own planes, trained its
own pilots, and provided accommodation for its crews. 19
The two airlines diverged over their approach to diversification. In its early
years, Qantas rejected several opportunities for diversification believing it would be a
distraction from their core business.2o In the post World War Two period, the
nationalized Qantas served as the national carrier of Australia, supporting further
horizontal growth of its fleet through geographic expansion overseas. The company's
first overseas passenger flight was to Singapore in 1935 and to United Kingdom by
1938. However, it was the postwar period that witnessed the main growth of its
overseas network including Japan and Hong Kong from 1949, South Africa from
17 Fysh, Hudson, Qantas Rising: The autobiography ofthe flying Fysh (Sydney,
1965), pp. 142-3,223-4.
18 Brimson, Samuel, Ansett - the story ofan airline (Dreamweaver Books, 1987),
p.77.
Gunn, 1985, pp. 86-99, 247-8, 358.
Fysh, 1965, p. 240.
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1952, and North America from 1953. Ansett's overseas expansion has been much
more recent and limited in nature, most notably into Asia in the 1990s.
Ansett had begun its airline operations when Reg Ansett diversified from his
taxi service, and diversification has been a postwar watchword of the company as it
responded to the limited opportunities for further horizontal expansion resulting from
Qantas's virtual monopoly of overseas flights. In the two decades following the end
of World War Two Ansett pursued related diversification to yield scope economies
with its national air services network. This particularly involved the establishment of
a chain of holiday resorts and hotels beginning in the Whitsundays in 1947. In
addition, it established helicopter and became the largest road freight operator. From
the 1970s it followed the trend of the time to diversify more extensively and broadly
into unrelated sectors, which included finance, credit cards, television stations,
furniture removals, restaurants, and stationery.
Utilities
AGL and SAGASCO used horizontal integration to claim market share in a
rapidly expanding industry, and supported it with strategic investments in vertical
integration and closely related diversification to shore up their leadership against
competitors. From the outset the industry was a capital intensive one where scale
economies were available to firms able to foster a growing market. As we saw in
chapter three, AGL, abetted by its early start and the support of local councils, was
quick to capture the Sydney market. Both it and SAGASCO were quick to adopt new
technologies that extended their dominance, for example large vertical retorts and
high pressure steel mains enabled them to extend their geographical coverage in the
interwar period.2I When LPG came along they were quick to distribute it to
customers without mains connections. The companies were also alert to the political
opportunities and challenges associated with their supply franchises. They were quick
to defend their rights and fostered important connections. After World War Two
SAGASCO saw major growth opportunities to provide supply to the housing
programs but faced a competitive threat from electrical suppliers. As a result, it
fostered close political connections with the State government and the South Australia
Housing Trust.22
Both companies vertically integrated the production and distribution of gas
from early in their history. This made sense on a number of levels - a lack of
alternative suppliers, the risk of hold-up if any firm gained leadership in gas
production, and technical non-separabilities in the production and distribution of gas.
From about the 1880s AGL and SAGASCO had vertically integrated forwards into
retail and marketing in order further to build scale. This included the sale and lease of
gas cookers and the provision of cookery lessons, demonstrations, and competitions.23
By the 1920s they were each operating retail showrooms. With the introduction of
natural gas in the 1970s both companies withdrew from the manufacture of gas, now
being provided by the oil companies, and concentrated upon distribution and
marketing. This enabled the companies to avoid the major investments required to
extract natural gas, and enabled them to shift away from their old image as
manufacturers of 'grimy' town gas. On the other hand, the companies lost some of
21 P. Donovan and N. Kirkman, The Unquenchable Flame. The South Australian Gas Company,
1861-1986, pp. 107-11.
22 P. Donovan and N. Kirkman, The Unquenchable Flame. The South Australian Gas Company,
1861-1986, pp. 221-3.
23 Broomham, p. 120; D &K, pp. 98-9.
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their strategic influence over the industry and vigilance was required regarding the
right of other producers to by-pass them in supplying major industrial users. While
SAGASCO fell out of the top 100 list after 1964 AGL has been able to maintain its
position helped by its return to upstream vertical integration particularly after Ron
Brierley acquired a large share of the company in 1986. Today, it remains a major
energy player with investments in oil and gas exploration and production.
Closely related diversification was pursued by both firms to exploit scope
economies and boost their strategic standing. Both companies were manufacturing
by-products of gas by the 1920s including sulphate of ammonia, coke, tar and its
derivatives, which drove down the cost and price of gas. Likewise, they sought market
diversification for gas, from heating to lighting, cooking, and in vehicles, and from
household to industrial consumption, using the forward vertical integration strategies
discussed above. It was only after 1986 that Brierley drove AGL into broader
diversification into gold exploration and property development but this was wound
back in the 1990s when the company diversified into electricity by taking advantage
ofprivatization policies.
Geographic expansion has played only a very minor role in the industry, both
companies largely exploiting localized supply franchises for much of their history.
Recently, AGL has expanded overseas as part of its expanded energy exploration and
production mission, including to New Zealand and Chile.
Wholesale and Retail trades
Sustained horizontal integration enabled a limited number of retailers to grow
rapidly in the early twentieth century at the expense of the established pattern of
dominant wholesalers and small suburban retailers of the previous century. The
growth of large capital city populations and improved transport systems provided the
conditions for large scale retailing. Department stores, Myer and David Jones,
occupied centrally located sites in easy reach for both customers and suppliers. Size
gave them scope economies, convenience for customers, and bargaining power with
suppliers. Myer's 'bargain basement' selection, for example, tapped its sophisticated
marketing and sales techniques across a wide range of merchandise and its ability to
buy cheaply from suppliers. Chain store operators, Woolworths and Coles, used scale
to offer low prices for an initially limited range of household items, and then
leveraged their expertise, reputation, and buying power into an expanding chain of
outlets and broader range of merchandise. Each of the corporate leaders also drew
heavily upon innovation to augment their standing and extend their horizontal growth;
we saw in chapter three that a regular flow of innovations characterized all stages of
the sector including supplier to store, in-store, and store to customer operations. The
retailers further strengthened their competitive position by building vertical onto
horizontal integration through internalizing buying functions to bypass wholesalers
and deal directly with manufacturers; in some cases this also involved integrating
backwards into manufacturing, for example into woollen mills in the case ofMyer.
After World War Two horizontal integration was extended rapidly as these
largely state-based firms grew into national organizations, particularly through
acquisitions in the 1950s. Diversification followed shortly afterwards for the chain
stores. Coles moved into food retailing in 1958 and in 1960 established the first free-
standing 'supermarket' with its own car park in Balwyn (Victoria). The supermarket
was an international trend driven by a range of social, spatial, and technical changes
including surburban expansion, the spread of the automobile, refrigeration, and double
income families. This enabled well placed retailers to build large out of town
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'supennarkets' offering a wide variety of foods conveniently located in a single store.
Price competition was intensified by low land costs and buying power.24 The
boundaries within the retailing industry were effectively breaking down in the 1960s
and 1970s as the leading companies continued to diversify. All the corporate leaders
moved aggressively into the discount market, building huge stores and relying upon
volume sales to win supplier discounts and thereby drive down their prices to narrow
margins. Myer achieved this through its Target stores, Woolworth through 'Big W',
and Coles by using the K Mart brand. The corporate leaders continued to diversify
their portfolio of retail services in the final decades of the century. This has included
the 'killer category', stores specialising in a narrower range of products than
department stores while competing with discount stores on price. In the case of Coles
Myer this included World 4 Kids, Office Works, and Mega Mart. Thus, the corporate
leaders in retailing have been quick to see new diversification opportunities. This has
been narrowly located within retail services, yielding sizeable scope economies
although Coles Myer, the most diverse retailer, has struggled in recent years to
manage its different market segments.
Multinational activity has not been a central part of the growth strategies of the
retail leaders. They have concentrated upon building share in a rapidly expanding
domestic market and being quick to introduce new techniques and methods.
Woolworths had a part interest in the New Zealand market from 1929 until 1978, and
Coles from 1988, while David Jones invested in a chain of Californian department
stores in 1974 but sold out ten years later.25
Bums Philp was the principal wholesaler to survive the growth of the giant
retailers although its relative position declined somewhat in the final two decades of
the century. Indeed, it was one of the five companies to survive in the top 100
through all six spot years, and its growth strategy played a major part in this success.
It used horizontal integration based upon overseas expansion to shore up its market
position, and supported this with vertical integration as a defence against the growth
of large scale manufacturing and retailing. Horizontal expansion provided the
company with the focused expertise and knowledge to spot growth opportunities.
They then used their position as a trade pioneer, particularly in northern Queensland,
to cultivate good government relations. The resulting benefits included government
support for new infrastructure, the award of mail contracts and agency work to the
company, and the defence of company interests against the interests of foreign
companies trading in the area including those from Japan and Gennany. As Bucklay
and Klugman noted, while they did not have 'personal top-level contacts at the heart
of the empire' in London, the company 'established intimate relationships with a
number of Australian government officials and politicians' .26
Horizontal growth was based specifically upon South Seas trading as their
core business. Bums Philp operated from a large number of trading stations
throughout the South Pacific, becoming a resource seeking multinational, operating
overseas from a much earlier period in their history than most Australian companies.
By 1914 they had overseas offices in United Kingdom, the Solomon Islands, Papua,
Java, the New Hebrides, Tonga, and Samoa, as well as a subsidiary in Fiji, a depot in
24 Boyce and Ville, Development, ch. 7.
25 Jobson's Yearbook, 1987, p. 401; Chow, 'The supermarket retailing industry' in Lewis et aI,
Case Studies in Australian Strategic Management, 1991, p. 108.
26 Buckley, K. and Klugman, K., The history ofBurns Philp: the Australian
company in the South Pacific (Sydney: Bums, Philp & Co Ltd, 1981), p. 275. Bums
Philp also had shipping contracts with foreign governments such as Fiji, Portugal, and Papua.
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the Gilbert Islands; in the following year they established their first New Zealand
branch at Wellington.27 These investments, however, provided them with little
relevant experience from which to leverage broader multinational expansion beyond
the region.
It was their vertical integration strategies, throughout the company's history,
which mostly sustained them against contractual threats from up and downstream
firms. Like many traders, the firm acquired its own vessels to overcome inadequate
shipping services and to guard against predation by large shipping companies. In due
course, though, it expanded its shipping operations in recognition of the shortfall in
the freight market, providing a network of regular inter-island services in the Pacific.
Burns Philp additionally acquired marine towage facilities and the coal supplies
necessary to fuel its fleet. As they expanded their interests through the islands of the
South Pacific, Bums Philp vertically integrated backwards into agency services and
the operation of plantations. Again this partly reflected inadequate supply and the risk
of predation. Additionally, the company recognized the market growth opportunities
in coconut, copra, and rubber on which most of their plantations were based.
However, it was the downstream threat that was the more serious as we have
seen above from the effectiveness of the large retailers. The company was quick to
recognize the threat, James Bums junior observing in 1931, 'the only way now for a
wholesale distributor to expand is by means of a chain of tied stores in which the
wholesaler has a controlling interest'. The following year Penney's Ltd was formed to
operate a chain of retail stores on behalf of the company, which by 1935 consisted of
25 outlets in Queensland and northern New South Wales. The company then went on
to acquire many stores in rural New South Wales.28 Around the same time (1935-7)
Bums Philp also substantially increased its plantation ownership also as a way of
ensuring throughput and to keep their vessels loaded for the passage back to
Australia.29 In the long run the plantation policy proved more successful than the
operation of retail stores. Although Penney's was said to be 'big and flourishing' in
1952, it was sold four years later to Coles. Many years later Bums' assessment was
that the company had lost out to the major retailers like Myer and David Jones by not
investing more substantially in capital city retailing in place of country stores, leaving
them without a strong metropolitan base.30
Media
The great Australian media empires were built upon a judicious combination
of horizontal and vertical integration mixed with narrow diversification within the
industry. Metropolitan-based newspapers, faced with growing urban markets, were
quick to exploit new large scale printing technologies that had become available in
North American and Europe. HWT in 1934 was the first firm to introduce printing
presses capable of producing 50 000 copies an hour at its new Flinders Street site.
The resulting scale economies and lower costs rapidly drove out smaller and regional
competitors with shorter print runs. The capacity created by the new technology
enabled the firms to expand horizontally to build national newspaper chains beginning
in the interwar period as we saw in chapter three. In addition to the adoption of scale-
based technologies, size also generated information economies since journalism costs
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leaders of these media firms modified the presentation and layout of their newspapers
to popularize them and thus expand their market.
Backward vertical integration helped protect the large newspaper proprietors
from hold up and improved their position with respect to foreign suppliers of
newsprint and journalism. HWT and the Fairfax Group were at the forefront of the
development of an Australian newsprint industry in the 1930s; in 1941 the first
Herald appeared printed on Australian newsprint?l In terms of news collection,
Australian newspapers bought news from Reuters from the l870s. Its position was
challenged in the twentieth century by the Australian Press Association and United
Cable Service, the latter under the control of Fairfax and HWT. In 1926 APA and
DCS negotiated more favourable terms with Reuters. Further renegotiation occurred
under the leadership of Keith Murdoch representing the newly formed Australian
Associated Press in 1942, and five years later a partnership was formed with
Reuters.32
Scope economies were leveraged onto these strategic growth strategies as the
firms used their sizeable production capacity to diversify their stable of publications,
offering both morning and afternoon papers together with magazines and colour
printing services. Thus, from the early 1920s HWT began publishing a morning
paper, the 'Sun-News Pictorial' and several editions of the evening 'Herald'. There
followed a bi-weekly 'Sporting Globe', a weekly country oriented 'The Weekly
Times', along with magazines such as 'The Australian Home Builder'. Scope
economies of information were also generated to some degree since similar and
related stories could appear in more than one publication. Branded mastheads
additionally provided some reputational economies.
The industry leaders were quick to recognize the opportunities for additional
and substantial scope economies of news content as a result of the emergence of new
forms of media. HWT was the first newspaper group to diversify into radio, setting
up 3DB in Melbourne in 1929. In 1955 it moved into television with the establishment
of HSV7. Packers' Consolidated Press diversified into television through Channel
Nine in 1956. The more recent growth of satellite and pay TV has been dominated by
News', particularly with the formation of Foxtel in 1994. These new types of media
provided the companies with the additional benefit of a large increase in advertising
revenues since radio then television became ideal channels for modem persuasive
advertising.33
The extent of related diversification within the media was, however, limited by
Federal regulations from the 1950s regulating ownership of the electronic media. The
Broadcasting and Television Act of 1956 limited the number of licenses a firm could
own. Substantial amendments to that legislation in 1987 capped the overall audience
any television network could reach and prohibited cross-ownership of print and
electronic media in the same city.34 As a result the comp:anies sought specialization
on print, television, or radio over the following years. 5 In particular, News was
obliged to divest its network television channels, Ten and Seven.36 Government
Sinclair, Keith Murdoch, 1952.
Read, pp. 164-6, 251-2, 267.
33 See Boyce and Ville, Development, ch. 7.
34 P. Chadwick, Media Mates: Carving up Australia's Media, 1989.
35 Bureau ofTransport and Communications, Economic Aspects ofBroadcasting Regulation,
Report 71,1991, tables 5.3 and 5.4.
36 Chadwick, Media Mates, pp. 41, 117-19. Rupert Murdoch's American citizenship additionally
barred him from ownership of an Australian radio or television licence.
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policy appears to have been a factor behind News' broadening of its diversification
strategy to include book publishing, film making, farming, and transport.
News Corporation stands apart from the Fairfax and Packer media empires in
that it has become a global player. It ranks as one of the world's largest media firms,
acquiring a string of overseas newspapers, magazines and book publishing businesses,
Twentieth Century Fox film studio, a string of TV stations in the US and satellite
operations for pay TV [Norton and Willcocks, 1993; Economist, 2001]. It initially
expanded beyond its Australian base in 1968 with the purchase of popular mass
circulation British newspapers, the News of the World in 1968 and the Sun in the
following year in a strategy consistent with the horizontal expansion policies it had
adopted in Australia. In the following decade News moved into the American market
and proceeded to acquire a series of foreign newspapers, magazines, and publishers.
By the mid 1980s it had begun to realign its activities increasingly around television
and film. By the end of the decade News had begun to act like a global company
using a standardized approach to its satellite services beamed to many parts of the
world. Norton and Wilcocks argue that this global strategy was based upon a, 'belief
that tastes, income levels, technologies, and even political philosophies around the
world were converging on the American model, producing strong demand for
American-style films and television programmes' .37 Irrespective of the extent to
which this overstates convergence, News had clearly transcended the problem faced
by many Australian multinationals of country and firm specific advantages that had
little relevance for much of the world. In particular, it was not located in the primary
industries, so long dominant in Australia, but rarely appropriate as global
organizations.
Construction and Property Management
The leading companies, L. J. Hooker and Lend Lease, adopted similar growth
strategies to successful firms in many of the other service industries mentioned above,
building vertical integration, related diversification, and belated internationalization
upon initial horizontal expansion. Hooker had built up the largest national network of
real estate offices by 1960, leveraging off their brand name and experience.
Thenceforth, they extended their network further by franchising from 1968, using the
same competitive advantages but at lower cost. By the 1990s the company had a
network of over 600 offices located across Australia, Hong Kong, PNG, and New
Zealand. A national presence provided the company with the springboard to exert
close control over the residential real estate market by additionally becoming a
property developer, reseller, and investor through vertical integration. Closely related
diversification took Hooker's into property management, to include sheep stations,
hotels, and motels [dates needed]. Scope economies were yielded by exploiting the
firm's existing core competencies in the industry.
Lend Lease, from its establishment in 1958, operated as a commercial property
management company, working closely with its parent company, Civil and Civic,
through a strategy known as 'design and construct'. C & C won contracts to construct
new buildings and, when completed, Lend Lease would sell the space or lease it to
tenants as an on-going investment.38 To further extend their horizontal expansion the
37 Norton, Julie E and Leslie Willcocks, 1993, 'The News Corporation', in Gerry Johnson and
Kevan Scholes, eds, Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text and Cases, Hemel Hempstead, 3rd ed, p. 627.
38 Murphy, M. (1984) Challenges ofChange: The Lend Lease Story (Lend Lease
Corporation, Sydney), 1984, pp. 31-2.
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companies tendered for major contracts that would raise their profile. In due course,
these would include the Sydney Opera House, Darling Harbour, Australia Square
(Sydney) and a variety of sporting stadiums. The initial growth strategy soon changed
when they won the Australia Square project. The enormity of the construction task
that began in 1962 motivated Lend Lease to establish a vertically integrated company.
Between 1959 and 1962 Lend Lease acquired six companies to supply elevators,
windows, and building materials.39 The benefits were in the form of reduced
transactions costs by establishing a single governance structure to coordinate complex
operations and prevent hold up ofa tight operating schedule.
Diversification followed close on this strategy as Lend Lease leveraged its
integrated property skills into the development of shopping centres with the postwar
spread of the 'mall' in Australia. In addition, it diversified into the residential housing
market in order to exploit the urban growth of Sydney, particularly that of
Campbelltown. Market diversification was also brought about with the expansion of
the investment side of the firm. The General Property Trust was established in 1971 to
offer units in a trust that would own and manage commercial properties. Its financial
services have since expanded to include insurance, banking, and funds management.
Like Hooker, Lend Lease have leveraged their industry skills overseas in
recent decades. Perhaps more so than Hooker they have been able to apply their firm
specific advantages in project design, construction, and management in many
overseas nations particularly targeting growth economies. A frequent pattern of
internationalization pursued by Lend Lease has been to win a major overseas contract
in order to establish a beachhead, then pursue additional contracts with the aid of a
local joint venture partner. Further expansion then leads to the setting up of a local
office in that country. Thus, for example, the move to New Zealand was initiated by a
major contract in Wellington, followed by a joint venture with Wright Stephenson in
the name of Challenge Properties. By 2002 Lend Lease could boast operations in 38
countries on six continents, with a si~nificant presence in the United States, Europe,
the Asia Pacific, and South America.4
Food, drink, tobacco
The dominant firms in this sector drew heavily upon new science-based
technologies imported from Europe and North America, supported by the
development of branded product ranges to expand horizontally and claim first mover
advantages. CSR, one of our five corporate leaders throughout the twentieth century,
expanded horizontally eliminating rivals with its low cost large scale and technically
advanced refineries. The company rapidly built backward vertical integration into
milling, plantations, and shipping, thereby ensuring the supply of its capital intensive
refineries was not held up by opportunistic suppliers or the lack of a market in
specialized shipping services.
By the 1930s with its virtual monopoly of sugar production well established
and the sugar market mature and slow growing, CSR turned to related diversification
to maintain their expansion. Substantial economies of scope were available by the use
of by-products of sugar refining to enter the alcohol and chemical industries, and the
production of building materials from waste sugar cane. The related diversification
into building materials continued strongly through the postwar period including the
production of vinyl flooring (1949), insulation and hardboard (1959), particle board
39
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(1960), pre-mixed concrete (1965), terracotta tiles, asbestos, cement products, and
architectural metal products (1969). Like many other companies, CSR also followed
the trend towards unrelated diversification in the 1960s and 1970s, investing heavily
in the energy and minerals sectors. These interests spread widely across oil, gas, coal,
iron ore, and bauxite/aluminium.
Many of these unrelated ventures incurred very large losses in the 1970s and
early 1980s, requiring the firm to reconsider its growth direction. CSR faced falling
commodity prices in the recession of the early 1980s and these problems were
compounded by diversified investments in businesses whose cash flows and earnings
were highly volatile. Fortunately, the company recognized these directional mistakes
and took steps to correct them. A strategic review in 1983 led to the divestment of
most of CSR's energy and mineral interests except aluminium to focus on sugar and
building products as its core competences. Most of its growth in the following decade
was in building materials whose share of company assets rose from 18 to 63 per cent,
1983-93.41
Another solution to CSR's rapid saturation of the Australian refined sugar
market was to tap into overseas markets. As early as the 1930s it exported more than
half of its output, a figure that had risen to 80 per cent by the late 1980s.42 In addition
to exporting CSR had acquired sugar mills in Fiji and an interest in an Auckland
refinery in the nineteenth century. However, like many other resource based
Australian multinationals at this stage there were limited opportunities to expand
further. Instead, it is only in recent decades that it has become a significant global
company. Bulky building materials are mostly unsuitable for large scale exporting and
provide broader leveraging opportunities than sugar milling and refining. This
motivated significant offshore acquisitions by the company particularly in the USA
from 1988, and the United Kingdom, Canada, Taiwan, and China in the 1990s. As a
result, more than 40 per cent of its revenues now derive from its building materials
subsidiary in the USA.
As we saw in chapter three, the brewing industry generated a significant
number of corporate leaders. The rapidly expanding urban market for beer and the
introduction of science-based advances into the industry by the turn of the twentieth
century provided opportunities for alert brewers to expand horizontally by introducing
capital intensive large scale production at lower unit cost. It was not until later,
however, that Australian brewers honed their marketing skills, developing brand
names to sustain their dominance. Tooth's became known for its 'pub art' marketing
in the 1930s, but the development of strong national brands came much more recently,
in response to the arrival of British brewer Courage in 1968 and the absorption of the
leading brewers into expansion-minded conglomerates in the following decades.
Vertical integration was a vital supporting strategy from early on. Upstream
integration secured supplies. Thus, CUB had an equity position in Joe White Maltings
from 1910 until the 1930s and invested in its own malting production facilities in
1952. Breweries integrated forwards into distribution functions by transporting its
own products and acting as agents for other beverages and supplies to hotels. Given
the bulkiness of beer and the importance of careful and prompt handling integration of
these functions was an efficient mode of operation. The most significant form of
41 White table 11.5 p. 198 (for 1983); Holst, Australia's Top 300 Listed Companies Handbook,
p. 107 (for 1993).
42 Lowndes, A.G. (ed.), South Pacific enterprise: the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company Limited (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1956), p. 155; White in Lewis et al fig
11.6, p. 214.
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vertical integration, though, was 'tied house' agreements, which gave the leading
brewers control over the principal retail outlets for beer. The consequence was to
create a powerful entry barrier particularly when the number of liquor licences on
issue was capped from 1907 until the mid 1950s; these agreements were finally
outlawed by trade practices legislation in the 1970s.
With a sustained expansion in the demand for beer and the effective control of
that market by a few corporate leaders, there has been only limited incentives to
diversify. Product diversification, therefore, has played only a minimal role in the
industry by contrast. In the 1990s Foster's expanded strongly into wine production
and sales along with other heavily marketed alternative alcoholic drinks such as
Subzero from 1996. It has also moved into property and hotel management and the
entertainment industry.
The brewers exported bottled beer to Pacific neighbours from the earliest days
and CUB consolidated their position with the establishment of a brewery in Fiji in
1958. However, it is in more recent times that the leading brewers have looked
overseas to leverage their skills, scale, and powerful brand names. Foster's lager
established a strong market position in Britain beginning in the 1960s. CUB's focus
on overseas markets has strengthened considerably in the last two decades with
acquisitions in United Kingdom and Canada. In the 1990s expansion by Fosters has
gone further afield into the developing markets of China and India although with
mixed success so far.
British Tobacco (Australia)'s dominance of the local tobacco market resulted
from its position as the holding company for the major local importers and
manufacturers. As we saw in chapter three its market share fell away sharply when
faced with foreign competition after 1955, suggesting it had made little attempt to
develop efficient growth directions. Its response was broad and largely unrelated
diversification into printing, vending machines, ten pin bowling, pastoral properties,
and food and drink interests. Among these various new directions, however, the
company dominated the snack foods market and cornered the highly valuable local
Coca Cola franchise, activities that it focused upon after 1989. The latter in particular
provided the firm, now Coca Cola Amatil, with the leverage to expand into Asia and
central Europe as one of the largest 'anchor bottlers' in the Coca-Cola system.
Jam producer Henry Jones concentrated initially upon horizontal integration,
building scale by enlarging production facilities. This gave him double the capacity of
all his rivals combined and drove down his production costs. He was an early user of
branding techniques as a means to sustain a market for his large production capacity;
all his products carried the !XL brand name from the mid 1890s. Jones then yielded
scope economies by diversifying narrowly into a widening range of food products
including pickles and sausages. The ever-alert Jones was awake to the threats from his
two main upstream suppliers, shipping and sugar. As we have already seen, both were
highly concentrated industries thereby increasing the risk of hold up for his large scale
capital intensive operations. His solution was to integrate backwards into shipping by
establishing his own fleet and, additionally, acting as agent for other lines in order to
improve working relations and reciprocity of dealing. Jones additionally sought to
integrate backwards into sugar with an abortive attempt to acquire a Queensland
refiner. Although unsuccessful, his action sent a credible threat to CSR that it should
not press this customer too hard. Jones also integrated backwards into saw milling to
provide timber for packaging, and into fruit and hop growing to supply his factories as
well as for export. Henry Jones was also early to commence internationalization,
sustained its fruit export business with the establishment of a London office in 1903.
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Six years later a factory was established in South Africa. Operations were also
established in New Zealand and an abortive attempt was made to set up in California.
The company is generally believed to have lost ground after Jones died in 1926 but
the initial strong grounding he provided ensured the company remained a force in
canned foods up to its acquisition by Elders in 1984.43
Nestle and Unilever bear comparison as foreign multinationals who settled in
Australia to exploit their reputation in branded food products. Unilever therefore grew
horizontally by dominating the branded soap market and Nestle in powdered and
condensed milk and milk drinks such as Milo. Nestle diversified into closely related
food products to exploit the scope economies of brand recognition, notably
confectionery after 1918 and instant coffee from the 1930s.44 Unilever continued to
concentrate upon the soap market until the second half of the century. Faced by
increasing competition from other multinationals such as Colgate-Palmolive, Cussons,
and Proctor & Gamble, Unilever began to diversify into the foods market from the
1960s.45
Chemicals and Petroleum
leI applied the same growth strategy in Australia as it had elsewhere,
diversified growth building on its research reputation and the wide range of
technological innovations in the chemicals industry in the middle decades of the
century. This took the company into such areas as paint, explosives, alkalis, dyes,
fabrics, plastics, non-ferrous metals, and petrol. This contrasted very much with the
pure petroleum multinationals, BP, Esso, Caltex, Mobil, and local firm AMPOL who
concentrated upon integrated petroleum production, combining refining, marketing,
and the operation of service stations. This combination of horizontal and vertical
integration sought to exploit the growth of the Australian market while protecting
their interests in a highly concentrated industry with very high levels of minimum
scale and capital intensity.
The strategy of Boral is the most instructive of the firms in this sector. Formed
in 1946 to refine bitumen from imported crude oil, it recognized scope economies
available from additionally producing fuel and diesel oil. As Hutchinson has pointed
out, this was probably a poor decision since the company was soon faced with tough
competition from multinationals able to establish huge refineries yielding low cost
oil.4 However, Boral redeemed itself by actively seeking out alternative markets for
oil by-products, which involved product and market diversification together with
vertical integration. Vertical integration in the 1960s was deployed to strengthen its
position and utilize its core competences in bitumen, upstream into quarries to secure
supply and downstream into road surfacing operations, ready mix concrete, and hot-
mix asphalt to develop new markets.47 By the end of the 1960s, however, the
company recognized the need to diversify out of bitumen if it was to sustain a pattern
of growth. Exploiting scope economies it turned to other building materials such as
reinforcing steel, concrete products, and brick plants. As the commercial property
market turned downwards in the early 1970s, Boral again showed nimbleness of
43 This paragraph is largely taken from Brown, I excel!
44 This Is Your Company, Nestles, 1946, pp. 103-6.
45 Brash, p. 319; Linden Brown, Competitive Marketing Strategy, 1990, pp. 206-7, 210-27.
46 Hutchinson, D. (2000), The transformation of BoraI: from dependent, specialist bitumen
refiner to major building products manufacturer. In D. Merrett, ed,Business institutions and behaviour
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47 King, 2000, pp. 23-87; Hutchinson, 2000, pp. 119-20
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strategy by diversifying into the residential construction and renovation sectors and
bolstering this with the development of a national brand. Additionally, Boral also
successfully diversified into LPG distribution to become the leading bulk distributor
in Australia.48 The final aspect of Boral's strategy was to expand internationally to
exploit further this successful formula; from 1979 they moved into the USA, UK,
Indonesia, Continental Europe, and North Asia.49
Glass, clay, non-metal products
The three dominant firms here AGM/ACI (glass), Humes (pipes), and James
Hardie (concrete and other building materials) built scale in their particular area
before leveraging off these competences to add narrowly diverse products and to
expand overseas. Each firm built scale effectively through being a leader in technical
innovation in the first half of the twentieth century. Humes pioneered the
manufacture of concrete pipes, Hardie the manufacture of fibro-cement. AGM
pioneered many aspects of modern glass manufacture, helped by a vertical integration
strategy that promoted a holistic view of technological change in the industry and the
consequent ability to apply learning-by-doing advantages.50
Humes was very quick to build product diversification and geographic growth
onto its initial leadership of concrete pipe manufacture in Australia. It established
manufacturing facilities in Singapore as early as 1922, in New Zealand by the
following year and additionally reached USA, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany,
Brazil, South Africa and several Asian nations by the end of the decade. Some
narrow diversification, also in the interwar period, included production of steel pipes,
other concrete goods, and various forms of metal fabrication. 51 ACI diversified more
slowly but more fully after World War Two. This was initially into a full range of
glass products, including window, sheet, and containers and followed this up with
diversification into related the areas of laminex, plastics, corrugated paper and
cartons, some steel products, and ceramic tiles. Finally, from the 1960s onwards they
added unrelated diversification into finance, quarrying, insurance, engineering,
building products, and white goodS.52 ACI was also later and more limited in its
overseas expansion, establishing interests in Singapore (1948), Malaysia (1968),
Indonesia (1973), PNG (1973), and China (1993). In the postwar era Hardie's
continued its horizontal expansion with the supply of fibrolite pipes to the mining
expansion of Western Australia. In addition, it extended its range of building
products, diversified the market for its key product, fibro-cement, and sought new
overseas markets in the 1970s - when the growth of the Australian building material
market slowed - particularly Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, USA, and the Middle
East.53
Transport equipment
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GMHolden's leadership of the automobile industry was built upon making the
correct 'make or buy' and locational decisions at different stages of the industry and
firm's development. The industry featured high minimum scales of efficiency that
early twentieth-century Australia could not obtain. Therefore, GMH initially
imported ckd units for assembly in Australia, drawing upon the scale economies of
GMH and then minimizing transport costs from USA. With high transport costs
within Australia the earliest vehicles were assembled at plants in major locations
around Australia. As local content increased, centralized assembly plants became
more cost effective, most tasks being completed in Melbourne and Sydney.
Government policy influenced the structure of the automobile industry in
many respects, perhaps most notably tariff protection's encouragement of local
production by foreign firms. In 1944 the Federal Government announced that it would
grant preferential tariff conditions to firms prepared to manufacture completely a car
in Australia. GMH along with Ford, Chrysler and International Harvester, took up the
challenge. In circumstances where there were no reliable local suppliers of particular
components the firms were obliged to 'make' not 'buy'. Thus, GMH established its
own foundry facilities to produce engine castings since the domestic foundry industry
was incapable of satisfying the technical requirements of GMH. As Maxcy has noted,
'the company ended up more integrated than it perhaps would have wished - at least
at that time,.54 Nonetheless, GMH showed an awareness of the benefits of using local
suppliers in place of vertical integration where they could work with competing
suppliers to mitigate the risk of 'hold Up'.55 GMH also vertically integrated forwards
from 1948 to establish its own dealer network. The company believed that control
over the quality and presentation of the vehicle could be more effectively managed
when compared with general retailers who had no loyalty to a specific automobile
company and could not easily be monitored.
The automobile industry has of course been dominated by powerful
multinationals. GMH exploited its ownership and location advantages in Australia to
serve as the export base for regional markets of New Zealand and South East Asia.
This enabled the firm to drive down costs through scale economies. Assembly
facilities were established in Indonesia in 1959, learning from the life cycle
experience accumulated in the Australian market.
As we noted in chapter three, GMH's lead over the industry narrowed in the
second half of the nineteenth century. Much of this has been due to the entry of new
competitors from Japan and Korea but it has been compounded by poor policy
decisions from the company, particularly insufficient investment in new technology
and updated models in the 1960s and early 1970s followed by the untimely
introduction of a large engine car later in that decade as petrol prices were rising
sharply. In the 1980s design and marketing deficiencies lost the company market
share in the supply of taxis.56 The loss of domestic and international sales in tum
lessened the cost-saving scale economies that company policy had built up over the
previous decades.
Leather, rubber, plastics
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The dominant finn here, and one of our five corporate leaders throughout the
century, was Dunlop. An active and flexible growth strategy saw the finn develop
from a rubber importer at the beginning of the century to a broad conglomerate close
to the century's end. The rapid growth of demand for rubber products in the twentieth
century provided the company with ample opportunities for horizontal and diversified
growth. Its factories were soon turning out a range of rubber based products
predominantly tyres but also shoes, golf balls, valves, tennis balls, clothing, and hot
water bottles. This modest diversification produced scope economies and additionally
addressed the intense competition in the 1920s from three other companies including
recently arrived Goodyear. Further opportunities to diversify rubber products were
embraced in the 1930s including foam rubber and latex products.
Postwar, Dunlop identified further competitive threats, especially from
Japanese finns, and opted for broader and increasingly unrelated diversification,
which included bedding, automotive batteries, medical products, and foods. Some of
these ventures have fared better than others. Arguably rather late and resulting from
investor pressure, Dunlop began a major programme of divestment in the late 1990s
and now concentrates on Healthcare products under the Ansell brand. Even in this
area, faulty pace makers exposed the technical problems ofunrelated diversification.
Dunlop has followed the common pattern of belated internationalization. Cuts
in tariff protection and export incentives in 1974 provided the impetus to seek lower
cost production locations including the Philippines, China, and Malaysia. In the
1980s it extended its overseas production to the USA, Thailand, and New Zealand.
Industrial machinery and household appliances
Rapid technological development in this sector and the generation of luxury
items for a population of rising size and income meant that innovation and speed of
action were vital to assuming leadership in this sector. Vertical integration and
related diversification were vital growth directions. AWA sought vertical integration
as their initial strategy in the 19l0s and 1920s. The finn grew on the back of the
expansion of demand for radios. Besides the production of radios and their
components, it vertically integrated forwards into the service and repair of radio sets
and, additionally into the operation of radio stations. Its innovativeness soon enabled
the finn to diversify into stereo equipment and radar products in order to yield scope
economies. It has been estimated that the company held as many as 3 000 patents for
radios and radar products. AWA leveraged its core competences in these technologies
to foster a close working relationship with the Federal government as the major
supplier of traffic control equipment and provider of the Beam Wireless service. The
advent of television gave the finn another set of products and related markets to
which it could apply its expertise in electronic equipment design and manufacture. By
1960 it was described as being in the 'envious position' of the leading television
producer and the only provider of key components such as tubes.57 In the following
decades further related diversification into new products took place including electric
fans, film projectors, communications equipment, air conditioners refrigerators, and
washing machines.
Growth methods of corporate leaders
57 Wild Cat, 5 March 1960.
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General patterns
In a similar fashion to directions of growth, corporate leaders recognized the
need for flexibility in selecting growth methods most suited to the prevailing climate.
A considered, rather than quick, response, however, was more important since
mergers and joint ventures are difficult and costly to reverse. Life cycle features are
generally discernible: Australian firms in their early stages rarely had the resources
for acquisition strategies and would concentrate upon internalisation. In addition, the
prime movers in an industry rarely needed to look beyond their boundaries for best
practice, but later entrants, or challengers, saw more opportunities from acqusition.
Interfirm agreements also occurred among smaller emerging firms seeking to share
development and other costs, but, were often more effective when organized among a
few large enterprises. In addition, Australian firms have often used interfirm .
agreements to launch overseas activities, something that has occurred late in the life
cycle of most firms. They have likewise been the domestic partner for interfirm
agreements with foreign multinationals entering Australia. Industry and firm-specific
trends can also be identified, as we shall see below, but trends over time have been
especially significant.
Internal growth was important for many firms in the first half of the twentieth
century. The limited sources of external finance available to Australian firms in the
absence of a sizeable public stock market or investment banks constrained large scale
fund raising to purchase firms. In addition, the limited number of listed companies
meant a focus on the acquisition of private companies, which was a time-consuming
business, based on incomplete information, and normally requiring the cooperation of
the acquired firm. While some firms became adept at private acquisitions, many
others relied more heavily upon ploughed back profits to finance incremental
increases in their operations. In many industries where only a few firms were in
existence, the opportunities for growth by acquisition were limited. Acquisition of
vertically related firms helped address the problems of contractual hold up discussed
above, and sometimes this was undertaken through buying a strategic block of shares
rather than attaining full control. While providing strategic influence at lower cost,
the ability to control and direct partially acquired firms has been limited in most cases.
The growth of listed companies and the expansion of alternative sources of
corporate finance over the last half century, discussed in detail in chapter five,
overcame the obstacles to an active market in corporate takeovers. In addition, the
rise of challenger companies by this time in many industries, eager to catch up with
the prime movers, were more likely to view merger as the preferred growth method.
Various estimates of merger activity between 1946 and the 1980s have been
undertaken for Australia, including the number of delisted companies, the number of
mergers, and the value of mer~ers, all of which point to a major expansion in merger
activity in these four decades. 5 There have also been also strong cyclical trends, with
merger activity rising in the 1950s, falling away sharply in the first half of the 1960s,
rising again to a further peak in 1969-72, falling away to the middle of that decade,
with further peaks in the early and then mid 1980s.59 We have extended these series to
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calculate merger activity from 1929 to 2001 by aggregating firms that were delisted
for reason of takeover and name change.60
The postwar growth of an active market in corporate takeovers provided a new
and accelerated growth path for firms. As we saw in the previous section, acquisition
enables firms to diversify rapidly into unrelated fields. At the same time, the credible
threat of acquisition exposes poorly managed firms to the discipline of the capital
market. More information is available about public corporations and the threat of
takeover is far more apparent. While private companies constituted up to a half of
acquisitions in the early postwar decades, by the 1970s the principal increase was in
the takeover of public companies.61 Active 'corporate raiders', particularly in the
1970s and 1980s, pursued the conglomeration fashion by seeking out newly exposed
firms, particularly in manufacturing, who were asset rich but undervalued as a result
of ineffectual management. The conglomeration fad has largely subsided and many of
the raiders have since fallen on their swords and their empires demerged, but the
credible threat to weak firms remains. An active mergers market has also accelerated
the process of rationalization in the declining primary and related industries, such as
pastoral agencies, thereby facilitating industrial restructuring.
Finally, as we shall see below, growth by interfirm agreement has been a
regular feature of many industries. It has helped firms enjoy some of the benefits of
scale in the small Australian market, particularly where synergies can be derived
without challenging the competitive instincts of firms, such as in infrastructure and
research and development when there is a strong public good element. Globalising
Australian firms in recent decades have drawn heavily upon agreements with overseas
firms. Interfirm agreements have additionally been used to mitigate uncertainty in
high risk activities such as mineral exploration which has been a key activity of a
number of corporate leaders. For firms in potentially declining industries, it has
enabled them to share operational costs so as to withdraw gradually or at least release
the funds to diversify. Recent Australian governments have also recognized the
beneficial elements of interfirm cooperation, which they have sought to foster. 62
However, we can also find examples where collusive interfirm agreements
have prevented or delayed the emergence to dominance of the most efficient firm,
thereby mitigating the full realization of scale and scope economies. At the beginning
of the twentieth century, inter-firm agreements existed in many industries including
the brick, confectionery, sugar, tobacco, dried fruit, fresh produce, mineral oil, coal,
and shipping industries.63 In many cases, price-fixing occurred at the expense of the
consumer and other firms. Suspicion particularly centred upon large and powerful
foreign enterprises that might threaten the evolving Australian manufacturing base. It
was the collusive agreement between the International Harvester Company and a local
firm in 1905 that led to the introduction of legislation on competition policy. The
Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906 outlawed many collusive practices.
While it may have contributed to the collapse of an agreement among the Newcastle
coal companies, the Act soon became a dead letter.64 The absence of effective
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(1967) and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1995), enabled
interfirm agreements to flourish. This contrasted with active competition policy in the
United States throughout the century, which forced the break up of many trusts, such
as Standard Oil, and drove others into full merger.
Industry patterns
Mining
Interfirm agreements and mergers and acquisitions have provided important
growth paths for corporate leaders in mining. Mergers helped firms to achieve scale
rapidly in an industry with very high minimum levels of efficiency. Interfirm
agreements helped to spread the substantial costs and risks of exploration. BHP's
acquisition of its major steel competitor, Australian Iron and Steel, in 1935 firmly
established its control of the industry. Similarly, WMC used mergers to establish
rapid dominance in the gold mining industry of Western Australia between the 193Os
and 1950s. A critical merger in the zinc sector was between CZC and Rio Tinto of
the United Kingdom in 1962 to form Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia. Rio Tinto brought
strong financial skills and resources, CZC local knowledge and rights in Australia.
The new company proved to have the strength to evolve as a powerful multinational
corporation, thereby overcoming the size and distance problems constraining many
Australian companies seeking to expand overseas.
However, it is perhaps the extent of interfirm agreements that is the most
notable growth method of the mining industry. The Collins House Group of mining
companies was the most extensive and sustained cooperative working relationship
amongst Australian firms. 65 Lasting from 1915 to 1951, it centred upon three of the
leading mining companies whose headquarters were located in the Collins House
building at 360-6 Collins Street Melbourne, notably North Broken Hill, Broken Hill
South, and Zinc Corporation. Other companies were periodically part of the group
either as participants or as partial or wholly owned subsidiaries. The original motive
for the Group was to fill a vacuum created when prewar German dominance of the
industry was terminated under the terms of the Enemy Contracts Annulment Act of
1915. However, the scale of operations now required was beyond the resources of any
single Australian company; as often during wartime, interfirm collaboration provided
a possible solution. Inspite of changed conditions after World War One, the
companies found it in their interests to continue and extend the work of the Groul and
in the process created, 'a non-ferrous metal group of international importance,.6 The
Group established a monopoly of lead, silver, and zinc production at Broken Hill and
went on to invest in English companies to secure involvement in zinc smelting in that
country. Their interest extended outwards from here into metal fabrication, chemicals,
and mineral exploration. Their initiatives are too many to list here but one example
serves to indicate their broad-ranging and pioneering influence through the
manufacturing sector. In 1936 the Collins House Group joined with BHP, General
Motors-Holden, ICIANZ, and P & a Steamship to found the Commonwealth Aircraft
Corporation.
Part of the reason for the continuation of the group for over thirty years was
that none of them had the resources to takeover one of the other dominant players,
65 Richardson, P. L., 1987, 'The origins and development of the Collins House
Group 1915-1951', Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 27, No.1, 3-29.
66 Richardson, 1987, p. 8.
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particularly in the context of an underdeveloped capital market. However, between
them they were able to take control of or eliminate many of the smaller players.
There were also many positive reasons for the Group's continuation. Above all else it
provided a flexible and lightweight structure in a rapidly changing industry. Decisions
could be made to acquire and dispose of subsidiaries on a regular basis, while
complex organizational structures could be developed by the companies not the
Group. The broad-ranging nature of the interfirm relations reinforced their appeal to
each firm. This included joint ventures, marketing arrangements, technological
collaboration, along with a range of supporting financial, legal, and secretarial
services. Inspite of all this, the Group had effectively broken up by 1951: the close
friends who had sustained the company links had now died, the interests of the
companies had decisively diverged, and the capital market was rapidly modernizing.
While nothing as encompassing and enduring has replaced the Collins House
Group, interfirm agreements remain of great importance in the second half of the
twentieth century. The major postwar expansion in demand for oil and natural gas
stimulated exploration for new sources. This has been a highly expensive and risky
business. Joint ventures have enabled firms to share the costs and risks of exploration.
A major discovery by a competitor could impact seriously on a firm's relative
standing in the industry, and therefore involvement in joint ventures was also a hedge
against discoveries by other firms. Such joint ventures were frequently international in
nature combining the resources and technical expertise of foreign multinationals with
the local knowledge and connections of Australian firms. Immediately after World
War Two in 1946, CZC established explorations joint ventures with a number of
overseas companies. These included with Standard Vacuum Oil of the United States
and BP in the exploration of oil and natural gas, and with Newmount Mining Corp,
also American, in silver and lead exploration.67 BHP's joint venture with Esso to
drill for oil in the Bass Straits in 1960 ensured a full transfer of leading edge drilling
technology from the American company.
Interfirm agreements hold many risks as well as benefits. Most are known to
fail because of a breakdown in working relations between the parties. Thus, while
designed to mitigate operational risks for mining companies, the joint venture in itself
presents new risks. This is particularly the case where agreements are with
governments and foreign companies, thereby crossing significant boundaries of
business culture. As a result, firms build up competences in the formation and
maintenance of such agreements. Firms like BHP have become very experienced at
entering into such complex agreements and identifying potential pitfalls in their
operation.68
Pastoral agencies
All three methods of growth were practised by corporate leaders in the
pastoral agent industry. Dalgety, the initial market leader, mostly grew by internal
expansion, establishing offices in new areas to follow the movement of settlement.
The followers, particularly Goldsbrough Mort and Elders, relied much more heavily
upon the acquisition of small local agencies to build their market share, the former
particularly in the interwar period and the latter in the 1950s.69 All firms, including
Dalgety, sought to achieve a national presence and provide a full line of services, and
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Until about the 1960s, most of the acquired finns were small private agencies rather
than listed companies. In some cases this made for expensive and drawn out
negotiations especially in the evaluation of the finn's 'goodwill', a significant part of
the value oflocal networked agencies. However, on many occasions the two finns had
previously worked in cooperation, the national leader selling the wool of the local
finn's customers and often providing finance and market infonnation. This made the
process of due diligence easier to complete. In addition, it was frequently the case that
the local finn initiated a proposed takeover when adversely affected by one of the
severe cyclical downturns that characterized the industry or when facing a succession
crisis. Elders as one of the most acquisitive finns became expert at assessing the
appropriateness of an acquisition, and handling the integration of merged finns into
their business, a process they referred to as 'Elderising'. 70
In 1963 the four leading finns in the industry merged into two, Dalgety joining
with NZLMA, and Elders with Goldsbrough Mort. This rationalization was overdue,
such had been the intensity of competition among them that the fanner was being
over-serviced and the finns' costs were far too high relative to their earnings. Merger
enabled significant cost-cutting particularly in the duplication of local branches and
head offices, in the process releasing spare funds for diversification into growth
industries. Since the 1970s the pastoral agents have become tied up with the
conglomeration movement, Elders-Goldsbrough Mort, for example, being absorbed
into John Elliott's empire in 1981 and then Futuris in 1996. Dalgety-NZLMA was
absorbed into another conglomerate, Wesfanners, in 1993.
In addition to the bilateral agreements between small and large firms that
characterised the early years of the industry, the corporate leaders had worked out a
delineation between areas of cooperation and competition. Cooperation covered the
infrastructure of the industry, sharing the costs of operating a national wool auction
market. The cooperation and pooling of resources amongst these large firms was
critical in establishing an Australian wool auction that largely replaced the London
market, bringing with it a range of benefits to farmers and to the broader Australian
economy. The companies cooperated in the diffusion of new techniques where
spillover benefits between agents and their farmer clients were clear, particularly
countering the spread of rabbits and other fonns of crop and animal feed infestation.71
Agents established their own industry bodies, both on a state and national basis, to
defend the industry's interests and arbitrate disagreements among members. Most
notable was the National Council of Wool-Selling Brokers fonned in 1919, initially to
deal with the postwar wool handling arrangements.
Financial services
The banks grew by a mix of internal expansion and merger. While sharing
many service features with the pastoral agents, there was no common market
infrastructure and much less spillover of interests, and therefore interfinn agreements
were uncommon. All of the leading banks today have been a product of regular
internal expansion together with waves of acquisition that have enabled them to
maintain their leadership for over a century. More often than not this has involved the
absorption of rivals within the top 25 or even top 10 financial institutions. A series of
such acquisitions occurred in the interwar period. The National Bank, a forerunner of
NAB, acquired the Colonial Bank of Australia in 1918 and the Royal Bank of
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Queensland in 1922. The English, Scottish and Australian Bank, a forerunner of ANZ,
acquired the London Bank of Australia and the Commercial Bank of Tasmania in
1921 and the Royal Bank of Australia in 1927. Bank of New South Wales, forerunner
of Westpac, acquired three major banks at this time, the City of Sydney Bank in 1917,
the West Australian Bank in 1927 and the Australian Bank of Commerce in 1931,
although they contributed less than half to the growth of BNSW's branch network.
Further sorting and consolidation among the largest banks occurred after World War
Two.
Shipping
Interfirm cooperation has a long history in the Australian shipping industry
dating back to the earliest years of capital intensive steamshipping in the nineteenth
century. Australian companies operated in an environment of intense competition
from British shipping and a series of collusive international shipping rings. In these
circumstances it was hardly surprising to fmd that Australian shipowners forged
cooperative alliances with each other. The aims of the Australasian Steamship Owners
Federation (1899) were to share information and establish a code of practice. From
this developed other mutual benefits such as ticket interchangeability, shared
advertising, and a system of deferred rebates and pooling arrangements similar to the
international rings. These arrangements remained with minor changes until World
War Two.
By 1945 the companies faced a series of additional problems, particularly the
impact of air and motorized road transport on the demand for coastal shipping,
together with waves of new technology raising further the capital intensity and
minimum efficient scale in the shipping industry. The risks were great of increasing
investment in an industry under these circumstances, with the result that the
companies replaced their informal interfirm agreements by the much closer
cooperation of a series of joint ventures. These were designed to share costs and
hopefully enable the companies to gradually withdraw from the industry or at least
have the funds to diversify. Bulkships was established in 1959 among the leading
shipping companies to build and operate bulk carriers. Five years later Associated
Steamships was formed to operate the coastal services of the companies. In both cases
Adsteam was the largest partner with a 40 per cent share rising to 50 per cent. In 1967
Associated Steamships in tum formed Seatainer Terminals, with a group of British
companies, to operate container cargo terminals in Australian ports.72
Mergers were popular in wartime to overcome tonnage shortfalls, and to
facilitate diversification. In Adsteam's case this allowed them to diversify into air
services (South Australian Airways, 1936), wineries (Mount Dangar Vineyards,
1968), and metal fabrication (Pacific Fabrications, 1975).73
Aviation
The importance of gaining market share quickly in aviation drove Ansett into
a policy of growth by acquisition. It rapidly acquired many competing domestic
carriers including Butler Air Transport (1958), Guinea Airways (1959), and
MacRobertson Miller Airlines (1963). Most important for Ansett, however, was the
acquisition of ANA in 1957 which had been one of the parties to the emerging two
airlines agreement along with TAA. Subsequent acquisitions enabled Ansett to
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pursue its diversification strategy; for example furniture removals (Wridgway
Holdings, 1972) and restaurants (Denny's, 1982). Its joint ventures were less common
and more often associated with its limited overseas expansion. This included a joint
touring operation in New Zealand with Midland Coachlines of New Zealand from
1973 and the establishment of Air Vanuatu in 1981 with the Vanuatu government.
Qantas, as the pioneering airline in Australia, grew by internalization in the
early years. As it began to develop an overseas network from the 1930s onwards it
sought interfirm agreements with other international airlines, particularly Britain's
Imperial Airways in order to operate a joint route between the two countries. In
particular the two companies jointly established Qantas Empire Airways Ltd in 1934,
each owning 49 per cent and an 'umpire', Sir George Julius the remaining 2 per
cent.74 After 1945 cooperation continued between the national airlines of the two
countries. More recently this has been formalized through British Airways 25 per cent
stock ownership of Qantas. By the 1980s the two airlines had extended their
cooperation to a group of other international lines including Lufthansa and American
Airlines.75
Utilities
The predominant growth path for AGL through most of its history has been
internalization. It had established a virtual monopoly around Sydney in the nineteenth
century and much of its subsequent expansion in the twentieth century was about
technological modernization and diversifying its markets. In these circumstances there
were very few opportunities for merger or interfirm agreements. Periodically it
acquired local gas companies in its path including Liverpool Gas Company (1928),
Katoomba and Leura Gas Company (1957), and a range of gas businesses around
New South Wales in the 1960s particularly in Wollongong, Grafton, Casino, and
Singleton.76 The firm became more acquisitive from the 1980s after Ron Brierley
bought into the company and pursued diversification, acquiring for example TMOC
Resources (1987-8) and CSR Petroleum (1988). Corporatisation of the electricity
market in many states in the 1990s provided AGL with the opportunity to acquire
electricity companies including Solaris Power in Victoria (1995-8) and ETSA Power
in South Australia (2000).
Wholesale and Retail trades
The major retailers largely followed a pattern of internal growth in the early
years of the century and of their corporate development by leveraging their
competitive advantages discussed under 'directions'. For Coles and Myer this enabled
them to expand within Melbourne and Victoria in the first half of the century.
However, the national growth of the corporate leaders after 1945 was largely based
upon a series of takeover battles of smaller mostly private retailers. Thus, Coles
acquired Selfridges (1950) for its stores in NSW and WA, F & G Stores (19567) in
country Victoria and southern NSW, Penney's (1956) in northern NSW and
Queensland, and the the Beilby chain (1958) in South Australia. These acquisitions
accounted for around 30 per cent of its stores by 1958. Similarly, Myer extended its
department stores across capital cities and states through acquisition: these included
Adelaide (James Marshall in 1928), Brisbane (McWhirter in 1955, Allan & Stark in
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& Co, 1961; Clutterbucks 1962, Mortimers 1967, The Western Stores 1967), Western
Australia (Bairds, 1969).
When the dominant variety chains, Coles and Woolworths, moved into food
retailing from the late 1950s, acquisition was again an important part of their strategy:
Dickens 54 self-service grocery stores in Victoria were acquired by Coles in 1958 and
250 grocery stores in NSW were purchased from Matthews Thompson in 1960.
Internal growth remained important, though, as indicated by the construction of its
free-standing supermarkets. The subsequent rush by all the leaders into discount
retailing was again helped by acquisitions; the purchase of Lindsay & McKenzie by
Myer in 1968 was used as the foundation for its Target discount stores, while Coles
entered into a joint venture with American retailer K Mart Corporation to set up K
Mart stores in Australia. In the 1980s the major retailers were caught up in the merger
boom, Coles acquiring the now ailing Myer, while Woolworths and David Jones both
passed through the hands of the conglomerate version of Adsteam until floated off
again in the 1990s to focus on their core activities.
No clear pattern is identifiable for wholesaler Bums Philp, which practised
acquisition, internal growth, and interfirm agreements with equal ease. The regularity
with which it acquired private firms including many overseas, suggests that Bums
Philp, like some of the pastoral agents, was an effective operator in the takeover
market prior to the rise of the listed company. Buckley and Klugman's detailed
history of the firm indeed indicates that they completed many successful acquisitions
in the South Seas trade. The firm appears to have been equally skilled in organizing
interfirm agreements of many types from agencies (with Forsayth's of New Britain),
to marketing infrastructure (Pearlshell Convention), and joint ventures (Rotuma
Traders Pty with Morris Hedstrom in copra trade).
Media
The dominant media barons relied heavily upon acquisition as their method of
growth. Applying their ideas, such as on popular mass circulation newspapers, and
their general expertise in newspaper management, together with the substantial scale
and scope economies available, they could add significant value to small local
newspapers. Herald and Weekly Times, the initial industry leader, built its national
presence with the aid of a number of major regional purchases including the
Advertiser in 1929, the Courier Mail in 1933, and the Argus in 1957.
However, it was the rise to leadership of News Corporation under Rupert
Murdoch that was founded above all others upon a broad policy of aggressive
acquisition in print and related media, entertainment and cable television in Australia
and global markets. Applying the synergies foreshadowed above he sought to buy
underperforming companies cheaply and then rebuilt them. In the 1950s and 1960s
News acquired an impressive array of local and regional newspapers in Australia,
ultimately acquiring former leader, HWT, in 1987. News added many of the national
newspapers in Britain including the Times and Sunday Times in 1981 and major
American regiona1s including New York Post(1976) and Chicago Sun-Times (1983).
Acquired book publishers included Angus & Robertson in Australia in 1981 and
Williams Collins in the United Kingdom in 1989. Television stations purchased by the
company included Australian regionals such as WIN4 TV in Wollongong (1963) and
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Sydney Channel 10 (1979) along with overseas stations, most notably a large stake in
London Weekend Television (1973).77
The company's subsequent moves into film and satellite required very large
funds, a situation made more difficult by a downturn in News main markets in the
early 1990s and therefore a large fall in advertising revenues. Part of the solution was
asset sales especially of publishing and newspaper interests but additionally by the
formation ofjoint ventures to sahre the costs and also the risks. Examples included an
alliance with Telstra to form Foxtel in 1994 and a joint venture with MCl
Communication in 1995 to create and distribute electronic information, education and
entertainment services worldwide.
Construction and property management
Both Hooker and Lend Lease established a prominent position by drawing
heavily upon internal growth, Hooker with a national chain of estate agent offices and
Lend Lease by the development of its design and construct approach. In each case,
however, they have drawn upon the merger or interorganisational method to meet
particular needs. Hooker began franchising in 1968 in order to extend further its
presence in the real estate agency market in Australia and overseas, whilst minimizing
costs but maintaining control over the brand name and service standards. In addition,
it drew upon the merger and acquisition method to diversify and vertically integrate.
These included the acquisition of home contractors in Sydney and real estate
investment companies in Brisbane. Lend Lease's innovative design and construct
concept largely involved the company working closely with its parent, C & C, on
repeated major projects. However, the enormity and complexity of the Australia
Square project in the early 1960s led Lend Lease to acquire a series of building
industry firms including concrete, brick, and elevator companies in order to ensure
full control over the operation. As we saw in 'directions' the company often resorted
to joint ventures as a beachhead in international expansion.
Food, drink, tobacco
CSR has relied upon its own internal growth for much of its history to sustain
its leadership. As a virtual monopolist in sugar refining there were few opportunities
for merger or inter-firm agreements. Nor did its related diversification strategies since
the 1930s result from acquisition. Much of this diversification was designed to yield
production scope economies from its existing output and used technology in which
the company was a leader in Australia. More recent unrelated diversification has
drawn upon mergers and joint ventures, particularly in minerals and energy. A series
of collieries were acquired in the 1970s, particularly in Queensland, New South
Wales, and Western Australia. Several mining projects were pursued with foreign
joint venture partners, which included American Metal Climax to develop iron ore at
Mt Newman, and with Swiss Aluminium Australia in a bauxite project at Gove in
Northern Territories. Most of these mining interests, however, were unsuccessful and
later divested. More recently it has completed more successful offshore acquisitions
and joint ventures in its core building materials activity. Examples include the
acquisition of the subsidiaries of ARC America Corporation, America's largest
concrete pipe producer (1990), and the formation of CSR-SYC Hebel Taiwan, a joint
venture to make autoclaved aerated concrete products in Taiwan (1993). These
77 More details ofNews' acquisitiveness can be found in R. Belfield, C. Hird & S. Kelly,
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examples indicate that CSR has been capable of all methods of expansion when
dealing in their core industries.
In contrast to CSR's experience, mergers have been a key leadership strategy
in brewing. Waves of merger activity have played ali important role in resolving a
periodic trend to overcapacity. The corporate leaders have taken the initiative in these
waves. Among the most notable was the formation of Carlton and United Breweries
in 190 to resolve a crisis of overcapacity in Melbourne as a result of the introduction
of new and more efficient brewing techniques in the previous two decades.
Thereafter, CUB periodically mopped up local and regional brewers. Helped by
improved transport facilities and the transportability of beer, CUB acquired and then
closed a series of breweries. This included three regional brewers in the 1920s. The
process continued after World War Two, with further acquisitions and closures in
1947, 1958, and 1962. This process was repeated throughout the country with regular
acquisitions by the leading brewers.
The most significant merger wave occurred between 1979 and 1986 resulting
in a virtual duopoly of Lion Nathan/Bond Brewing and CUB/Fosters as we saw in
chapter three. The recent international expansion of these firms has combined
agreements and mergers. Licensing agreements to brew the beer of a company from a
different country have been common: in 1981, for example, Fosters was brewed under
licence in England by Watney, Mann & Truman. Following CUB's acquisition by
Elliott's Elders in 1983, the brewer aspired to becoming a global player and
'Fosterise' the world. In these circumstances acquisition became a key policy by
giving the firm close control over its international expansion. Thus, by 1986 it was
acquirin~ major foreign brewers, Courage in the UK and Carling O'Keefe in
Canada. 8 More recently, joint ventures have been used as a means of accessing the
more sensitive Chinese market.
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